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Based on the pace of change, reform strategy can be categorized as “Change 
and Adjust Strategy (CAS),” which emphasizes urgent and immediate 
implementation of necessary changes and making subsequent adjustments 
later; and “Plan and Change Strategy (PCS),” which involves the deliberate 
crafting of a perfect reform plan that is implemented in a gradual and systematic 
manner. The former strategy may either bring about the desired outcome or go 
in the wrong direction, while the latter strategy, despite being prudent and error-
minimizing, runs the risk of interruption before bringing about concrete results. 
The initial South Korean defense reform plan, Defense Reform 2020 (DR 2020), 
started with strong ambition but failed to achieve any impressive result before 
being replaced by Defense Reform Plan 307 (DRP 307) in March 2011. The 
original DR 2020 planned to achieve reform of the South Korean military over the 
course of more than 15 years, ending in the year 2020. However, the change of 
administrations and Defense Ministers interrupted this plan. North Korea’s attack 
on the South Korean navy warship Cheonan in March 2010 also delayed the 
implementation of DR 2020. During the 51 months from the passage of the law 
for DR 2020 to the emergence of the new DRP 307, there was no meaningful 
implementation. South Korean DR 2020 clearly demonstrated the downside of 
the PCS. 
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he current Park Geun-hye administration of the Republic of Korea (ROK) 
announced a new defense reform plan on March 6, 2014, which targeted the 
year 2030. The key features of the plan include the reduction of the total military 
force strength by 110,000 soldiers, change to a corps-centered army structure, 
expansion of the role and number of non-commissioned officers, and the 
acquisition of new weapons and equipment. However, most of these features 
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sounded familiar, having already appeared in the “Defense Reform 2020 (DR 
2020),” which started back in July 2004 during the Roh Moo-hyun 
administration. The new plan seems a rehash of DR 2020, with lukewarm 
implementation efforts. 
 During the Roh Moo-hyun government, in July 2004 South Korean defense 
minister Yoon Gwang-ung initiated DR 2020 by organizing an ad hoc team to 
develop a reform plan targeting the year 2020. The plan was completed and 
reported to President Roh in September 2005. The defense minister also tried 
to guarantee the continuous implementation of the long-term reform efforts 
regardless of the inevitable change of administrations. Yoon managed to persuade 
the South Korean National Assembly, and the law on defense reform was passed 
in December 2006. 
 However, implementation of DR 2020 did not go as Yoon had expected. 
Shortly after its inauguration, the succeeding Lee Myung-bak administration 
began its review of the reform plan, and announced another, modified plan in 
June 2009. However, the Lee administration even replaced this modified plan 
in the wake of North Korea’s torpedo attack on the ROK warship Cheonan in 
March 2010 and bombardment of South Korea’s Yeonpyeong Island in November 
of that same year. As a result, the projects specified in DR 2020 had no chance 
of implementation as these projects were not put through a process of frequent 
review. In the end, the Lee administration pushed back the target year from 2020 
to 2030. The South Korean military have produced several good reform plans, 
but hesitated in implementing DR 2020 during the change of administration 
from Roh Moo-hyun to the current Park Geun-hye administration. 
 I argue that rather than a good plan, South Korean defense reform requires 
a proper implementation strategy. If DR 2020 had adopted an effective 
implementation strategy, it would have produced a few significant changes before 
returning to the normal stage of gradual development or enhancement. There 
must have been a significant strategic flaw related to the implementation of South 
Korean past defense reform initiatives. If the Park Geun-hye administration does 
not want to repeat the same mistakes as its predecessors in its defense reform, 
then the administration needs to rectify the implementation strategy based on 
the unsuccessful experiences of the past reform initiatives. To this end, I analyze 
the implementation strategies of DR 2020, which started in 2003. 
 For this purpose, I analyze the strategy of change that the South Korean 
military leaders applied to their reform efforts since the inception of DR 2020. 
I argue that if they had employed a speedy implementation strategy, they would 
have yielded superior outcomes than they achieved in their reform initiatives. 
To examine the argument, I borrow a few necessary insights from scholars 
specializing in reform, innovation, and revolution in military affairs. I particularly 
rely on Stephen P. Rosen’s findings on military innovations as a frame of 
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reference to focus on strategy among key factors related to defense reform.
FACTORS AND STRATEGIES RELATED TO DEFENSE REFORM
FACTORS RELATED TO DEFENSE REFORM
Various factors, or independent variables, can decide the final outcomes of reform 
in the military. The budget factor stands out as one. However, there is no case 
where the entire required budget for the reform was provided. An able defense 
leader can prioritize well and find ways to overcome a budget shortage. The 
amount of budget affects not the success or failure of the reform but the speed 
of its implementation. Rosen (1991, 252) argues that there is “no relationship 
between levels of resources and the numbers of innovations an organization 
made. . . . the successful innovation examined were initiated in periods of 
constrained resources at least as often as in periods during which budgets were 
large and growing.” 
 The resistance from members of the military—especially senior leaders—
could hamper reform efforts. By their very nature, bureaucracies are resistant to 
change, in particular military bureaucracies, which are usually more conservative 
than general government bureaucracies. Military bureaucracies can be very 
resistant to reform-level change. That is why several military theorists insist that 
civilian leaders must intervene to force change in the military (Teriff, Farrell, 
and Frans 2010). However, such bureaucratic resistance may be manageable if 
a reformative leader has the power to decide the promotions of members and 
the flexibility to accommodate their critics and recommendations (Park 2008). 
Rosen pointed out that civilian intervention to reduce bureaucratic resistance in 
the military seems not as crucial as the strategy of military leaders for innovation 
(Rosen 1991). As long as the top military leaders have their own vision and will 
for the military reform, they can manage to find the right tools to persuade their 
subordinates.
 One must also consider the influence of political and social factors to military 
innovation in a country (Rosen 1988). In the case of South Korea, different 
ideologies of different administrations influenced the defense reforms (Klingner 
2013). However, strategy is the key to meeting end goals (U.S. Joint Chiefs of 
Staff 2013, II-5). Political and social factors constitute the environment, which 
a reformative leader should handle with a creative strategy. “Peacetime military 
innovation occurs when respected senior military officers formulate a strategy for 
innovation” (Rosen 1991, 21). 
 Therefore, I argue that the obstacles to reform discussed above can be 
overcome as long as a reformative leader has the right strategy. For example, 
former U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld sped up the transformation 
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of the U.S. military and made significant changes to the U.S. military during his 
term (O’Rouke 2004; Zakheim 2007), despite having to fight for the necessary 
budget, spar with generals in the military about the reforms, and persuade the 
political opposition in the Congress. As Dov S. Zakheim (2007, 26–27) describes: 
“both the American and Korean attempt at defense have much in common. 
First, they are both vulnerable to the vagaries of legislative budget decisions. 
Inadequate budgets, as well as the diversion of resources to other activities . . . 
. Second, insufficient ‘buy-in’ by the senior military leadership likewise can derail 
transformation efforts. . . . Finally, and most important of all inadequate sustained 
commitment by successive holders of top leadership positions . . . will slow 
transformation’s momentum.” 
STRATEGIES FOR DEFENSE REFORM
Strategy for a defense reform might involve various elements, such as whether 
to use a top-down or bottom-up approach, concentrate on a few key fields or 
cover the entire military, seek civilian help or not, etc. The reformative leader 
formulates a relevant strategy by making the right choices regarding all the 
approaches and means for the reform. However, the speed of change—a key 
feature of any reform—arouses much debate, as evidenced by the recent reform 
efforts of the U.S. military. 
 Because the former U.S. Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, pursued his 
defense reform (i.e., “Defense Transformation” or “Military Transformation”) so 
rapidly, criticisms and debates regarding the speed of change ensued. Most of all, 
the military community and outside critics harshly criticized Secretary Rumsfeld 
for the hasty implementation (Murray and O’Leary 2002; Czelusta 2008). Some 
military theorists conducted research on the right speed of change partly to 
defend their Secretary. Hans Binnendijk (2002, 76–78) at the U.S. National 
Defense University contrasted a revolutionary change strategy (“leap ahead 
strategy”) and an evolutionary change strategy (“steady as you go strategy”), 
explaining the strengths and weaknesses of both strategies. Leonard L. Lira 
(2004) at the U.S. Military Academy contrasted a “First-Order Change” and a 
“Second-Order Change” and defined the transformation of the U.S. military as 
the latter.
 In fact, social scientists have debated over the speed of change. Samuel 
Huntington (1968, 344) contrasted revolution and reform, explaining that 
revolution involves “rapid, complete, and violent change in values, social 
structure, political institutions, governmental policies, and social-political 
leadership,” while reform involves “changes limited in scope and moderate 
in speed.” Scholars in business management have also explicated a similar 
contrast-i.e., ‘revolutionary change’ and ‘evolutionary change’—as means to adapt 
to changing business environment (George and Jones 2005).
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TWO CURVES OF CHANGE
As discussed above, there are two contrasting types of change in reform efforts, 
which I illustrate in Figure 1. 
Figure 1. Two Patterns of Change
 
                       Source: Park (2012, 156).
 In Figure 1 above, Curve A initially exhibits rapid changes and later shows 
a reduced speed of change. Curve B exhibits slow changes early on, with an 
accelerated speed of change over time. If all the allotted amounted of time for 
the reform has passed, the two curves would end at the same degree of change. 
However, if the plan for change is stopped in the middle—for example, at point 
T1—then the level of achievement would be very different based on the curves 
applied. While Curve A could boast considerable changes even at point T1, Curve 
B could show a minimal result because of its slow and long-term implementation 
schedule. 
TWO STRATEGIES OF CHANGE IN DEFENSE REFORM
The militaries, in pursuit of a defense reform, would generally select a strategy 
between the two types of change (as illustrated in figure 1) in accordance with the 
external and internal situations. I would like to call Curve A in the figure 1 the 
“Change and Adjust Strategy (CAS),” which adopts the concept of “revolution, 
revolutionary change, and leap ahead.” Curve B can be called “Plan and Change 
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Strategy (PCS),” which adopts the concept of “reform, evolutionary change, 
steady as you go.”
TYPE 1: CHANGE AND ADJUST STRATEGY (CAS)
In addition to fostering speedy changes, CAS may prefer a fundamental change 
by denying the continuation of the current status quo. This strategy aims to make 
rapid changes across the field. It accepts the side effects of changes as a necessary 
cost and is ready to deal with the calculated risk.
 When challenges cannot be dealt with effectively via a conventional or gradual 
approach, a speedy and comprehensive change is required. For example, if 
challenges created by the technological advancements of the Information Age 
cannot be handled well by a gradual adaptation, the opposite strategy should 
be explored (Binnendijk 2002). If the problems of a certain military have not 
been solved by several reform attempts of gradual change, a more speedy and 
comprehensive strategy should be explored and adopted.
 Because the CAS concentrates on the implementation of changes, it can result 
in considerable achievements in a relatively short period of time. It can spread 
the culture for change to all the members of the organization and make them a 
part of that change. It may not allow time for opponents to the planned change 
to resist. Like flames of fire or a flood of water, the CAS can expedite and expand 
changes across the organization, achieving a result with little resistance in a short 
period.
 However, the CAS can involve much trial and error in the course of its speedy 
implementation. One can jump to a conclusion that could turn out to be wrong 
later and create considerable side effects. Because speedy implementation of the 
reform is the top priority, such strategy may be unable to organize changes in a 
systematic and consistent way.
TYPE 2: PLAN AND CHANGE STRATEGY (PCS)
The PCS intends to prevent the trial and errors of the CAS through a gradual 
implementation, in-depth reviews, and open discussions during the reform 
process. This strategy tends to spend considerable time developing complete 
plans with detailed implementation roadmaps, and tries to build consensus for 
the plan among members before implementation. It prefers continuation during 
the whole time. Because of these moderate characteristics, one might consider 
the PCS as a safe and preferred strategy.
 The strength of the PCS includes a reduced possibility of trial and error, 
thanks to carefully developed plans and detailed roadmaps. If a negative aspect 
of change is found, such would be addressed in advance. Every emerging new 
element is incorporated. One can revise continuously the direction, contents, and 
speed of changes in pursuit of the PCS. Because of its strong dependency on in-
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depth discussions and consensus of the reform plan, the PCS is unlikely to make 
members of an organization anxious about the beginning and end of the reform. 
The initial investment of time and money in the PCS is smaller than that in the 
CAS.
 However, the most worrisome downside of the PCS is the strong probability of 
interruption prior to reaching any achievement. Leader or membership changes 
may occur, or alterations in the environment before full implementation of 
the planned changes. In addition, with the longer planning process comes the 
possibility of opposition to the plan growing stronger. The proponents of a reform 
may be vulnerable to such opposition if achievements are not made in the initial 
stage of the reform.
 
APPLICATION OF THE STRATEGIES
Without the promise of big and fundamental change, the CAS can hardly get the 
support of the people and members of the military. The PCS will appear more 
realistic than the CAS due to its low risk and gradual increase of investment. 
There is also no guarantee that the adoption of the CAS would create success 
as promised and result in revolutionary or even significant improvement in 
capabilities (Blackwell and Blechman 1990). 
 In theory, the PCS is safer than the CAS because the down payment and risk 
involved are less. However, in practice, the PCS can be used as an excuse not to 
change and can be thwarted at any point during its process. The PCS can allow 
complacency to reemerge in the name of prudence, allowing for open-ended 
discussions to follow. The PCS tends to strengthen the status quo and devalue 
the future vision as risky (Conetta 2006). For these reasons, the successful 
implementation of the PCS is more difficult and requires greater leadership and 
talent than the implementation of the CAS (Huntington 1968).
 The best solution might be to combine the strengths of the two strategies while 
heeding their weaknesses. However, such is easier said than done. The rhetoric of 
combining the two can leave reform initiatives stalled because of inconsistency in 
the reform strategies. The simple combination of these two strategies can ignore 
the unique situation that a certain military should overcome. If a military believes 
that it is in a situation that requires speedy changes, it should adopt the CAS; 
otherwise, it should select the PCS. 
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SOUTH KOREA’S DEFENSE REFORM 2020
BEGINNING OF DEFENSE REFORM 2020
Political leaders of the Roh Moo-hyun administration rather than military leaders 
initiated the South Korean DR 2020 (Defense Reform 2020). South Korea’s 
so-called “386 Generation,” who were instrumental in getting Roh Moo-hyun 
elected as President of the ROK, sought for Korea to retake the Operational 
Control Authority from the Commander of the CFC (ROK-U.S. Combined Forces 
Command) and dismantle the CFC in the name of sovereignty. Reform of the 
military was seen as necessary to persuade the South Korean people that the ROK 
military is strong enough to defend the nation without the direct help of the U.S. 
military.1
 In early 2003, the first defense minister of the Roh administration, Cho Young-
gil, started his reform initiative to “adapt to the changed security environment 
and potential types of future war” (Ministry of National Defense 2006b, 36). 
However, a year after his appointment, the defense minister was replaced by 
the then defense advisor to President Roh. The political leadership of the Roh 
administration thought that both Minister Cho’s reform plan and execution of it 
were not ambitious or proactive enough (Kwon 2013).
 After taking office in 2004, the newly appointed defense minister, Yoon 
Gwang-ung, emphasized the urgent need to reform the entire defense sector. 
Yoon organized a small and exclusive team to formulate an initial concept for 
the reform. Subsequently, he organized the Defense Reform Committee in the 
Ministry of National Defense (MND) in June 2005 and ordered it to turn the 
basic concept into a comprehensive and detailed plan for the long-term reform 
of South Korean military. The committee followed the minister’s order, naming 
the plan DR 2020 and reported the plan to President Roh in September 2005. 
After receiving the president’s approval, the committee started to draft the 
defense reform bill in order to ensure long-term and continuous implementation 
regardless of changes in administrations or defense leaders. However, members 
of the National Assembly discussed the bill for almost a year before ratifying it as 
law in December 2006. Unfortunately, Minister Yoon had to resign about a week 
before the passing of the law in the wake of a shooting incident that occurred the 
previous year at a guidepost in the border area.
 “The Law on Defense Reform” mandates that the South Korean military achieve 
the following goals: (1) transform the manpower-intensive force structure to a 
technology-intensive one; (2) transform the defense ministry from a military-led 
organization to a civilian-led one; (3) strengthen the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) so 
that they can effectively conduct modern joint warfare; (4) secure the necessary 
1 For discussion on the initiation of the defense reform by political leaders in the Roh 
administration and the resistance from the South Korean military, see Kwon (2013).
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defense budget for successful reform during the fifteen-year period ahead; and (5) 
balance South Korea’s self-reliant defense policy with its alliance with the United 
States (National Defense Reform Act 2006). 
 Based on the law, the Ministry of National Defense of the ROK (MND) 
announced a plan to reduce military manpower from 680,000 troops to 500,000 
by 2020 (the 522,000 target level of the current administration’s reform plan 
is less ambitious that this), while streamlining the army’s command structure 
(the same corps-centered structure as the current administration’s). It promised 
to increase the proportion of civilian officials among the entire workforce 
of the MND and noncommissioned officers in the field units. It emphasized 
strengthening the JCS to ensure more effective joint operations. It estimated the 
whole defense budget available until the year 2020 to be 621 trillion won (about 
621 billion US dollars), based on the assumption of a 7% annual growth in the 
Gross Domestic Product on average during the period. The law mandated the 
preparation for retaking the wartime operational control authority over South 
Korean forces from the Commander of the CFC to JSC in 2012 (Ministry of 
National Defense 2006b). It was to build “qualitative modernized forces resting 
on advanced technology rather than a force whose strength is measured by the 
number of soldiers” (Nam 2007, 186). 
REVISION OF DR 2020
The Law on Defense Reform turned out to be less effective than expected. The 
implementation schedule stipulated in the law was not as speedy as a reform 
dictated. Most of the fundamental changes, including the meaningful cut in 
military personnel and the creation of a unified ground operations command, 
were planned to take place at the last part of the reform period, near the target 
year of 2020. Thus, the passage of the law did not lead to any immediate results.
 At the same time, Minister Yoon’s replacement, Kim Jang-soo, did not 
emphasize the speedy implementation of the plan as Minister Yoon might have. 
One could characterize his term as a transitional period to the next administration 
due to the planned presidential election just a year later in December 2007. He 
apparently decided to hand over the implementation of DR 2020 to the next 
administration.
 The successor Lee Myung-bak administration, which was inaugurated in 
February 2008, rested on the strong support of the South Korean conservatives, 
who did not agree on the key elements of DR 2020. In particular, the Lee 
administration held quite a different ideology from its predecessor, the Roh 
administration, regarding North Korea and the ROK-U.S. alliance. The Lee 
government regarded the force reduction and taking OPCON authority back from 
the CFC as risky initiatives. Therefore, the Lee administration came to review 
the whole contents of the plan in a fundamental manner. It ordered the Office 
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of Defense Reform in the MND to do report a “less risky” revised plan. In fact, 
President Lee was not much interested in defense reform. The first minister of 
defense of the Lee administration, Lee Sang-hee, was more interested in the 
military’s preparedness against immediate provocations of North Korea than 
future reform, as demonstrated by his slogan, “Fight Tonight” (Kwon 2013, 
250–252). Furthermore, there was not much interaction between the presidential 
office and the MND on the defense reform plan. As a result, Defense Minister Lee 
used the excuse of there being a limited defense budget to reduce the scope of 
reform and the speed of change. 
 Minister Lee announced a revised version of DR 2020 in June 2009 after 
spending fourteen months to review the original plan. The revised version 
corrected the defense budget estimate from 621 trillion won to 599 trillion won. It 
increased the target number of force reduction from 500,000 to 517,000 in 2020, 
added a few new projects including the establishment of standing peacekeeping 
forces, and postponed several expensive projects including acquisition of the 
high-altitude unmanned reconnaissance aircraft and refueling aircraft (Park 
2009). The roadmap for implementation was also delayed accordingly.
THE IMPACT OF THE CHEONAN AND YEONPYEONG INCIDENTS
Two North Korean provocations in 2010 seriously affected the implementation of 
the revised version of DR 2020. North Korea attacked and sank the South Korean 
navy corvette Cheonan in the Yellow Sea near the Northern Limit Line (NLL) by 
a torpedo attack on March 26, 2010. The South Korean people recognized the 
harsh reality of tension between the two Koreas and were very much disappointed 
with the poor combat readiness of the South Korean military. President Lee 
Myung-bak summoned all key military commanders and demanded across-
the-board changes in the military. He established a special committee under 
his control to find the key problems of the South Korean military and listen 
to recommendations (Hwang 2010). The committee immediately started to 
review the revised version of DR 2020, visited and checked key units in the 
field, interviewed defense experts and military officers, and demanded more 
fundamental reform of the South Korean military. The DR 2020 was stopped 
once again and went through another thorough overhaul.
 The other North Korean provocation, a blatant attack on South Korean 
territory, Yeonpyeong Island, with artillery and rockets, occurred on November 
23, 2010, just eight months after the Cheonan incident and just before the 
special committee’s schedule for the completion of the review. The ROK military 
disappointed the South Korean public again by its poor responsive actions to the 
North Korean artillery attack. The people pressed the defense minister to resign 
and demanded a more drastic reform of the military. The special committee 
could not wrap up its previous findings and had to develop more fundamental 
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reform projects at the last minute to ease public sentiment. Finally, it reported 
its recommendations to President Lee in late December 2010, highlighting the 
creation of the Joint Operations Command as a controlling tower over all forces 
in operation (Yu 2010). The threat that the reform plan wanted to address 
was changed from all potential future threats to the imminent North Korean 
provocations (Klingner 2011). The original DR 2020 seemed to be distorted. 
Before generating any recognizable results, the DR 2020 was transformed into 
quite a different version than what had been passed into law four years prior. 
THE DEFENSE REFORM PLAN 307
The newly appointed South Korean Defense Minister, Kim Kwan-jin, could not 
simply follow the recommendations of the special committee. He was advised 
that the creation of a Joint Operations Commander might become controversial 
in terms of constitutionality. Some argued that creating this new position—which 
would be lower than the Chairman of the JCS but higher than the service chiefs 
and not in the list of key military posts, which should be approved by the Cabinet 
Council for the appointment—might infringe the Constitution. The controversy 
itself would stop the implementation of the recommendation made by the special 
committee. Therefore, the minister asked for additional review and had to spend 
a few months before making his decision.
 Defense Minister Kim came up with his own plan to reorganize the higher 
command structure instead of creating the Joint Operations Command. He 
decided to give service chiefs more authority such as authority on the employment 
and operation of the military forces in addition to their original authority for force 
management. He reported his own reform plan to the president on March 7, 2011, 
naming it after the date of its reporting (“DRP 307”). The plan was released the 
next day. He promised to complete the implementation of 37 short-term projects 
by the end of 2012, 20 mid-term projects by the end of 2015, and 16 long-term 
projects by the end of 2030.
 Defense Minister Kim emphasized the reorganization of the higher command 
structure as the number one priority. In late May 2011, he requested the National 
Assembly to revise the related laws for the reorganization. He wanted to revise the 
laws in 2011, implement the reorganization in 2012, change the reorganizations 
of subordinate commands accordingly in 2013 and 2014, and complete the whole 
reorganization in 2015 (Ministry of National Defense 2011). 
 However, Minister Kim’s initiative, especially the reorganization of the higher 
command structure, met with strong opposition from retired generals, especially 
retired air force and navy generals. They accused the reorganization of giving 
too much power to the JCS Chairman, who would mostly be an army general. 
The opposition party lawmakers and a few ruling party lawmakers, most of them 
of a military background, bought the accusation and decided not to support the 
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minister’s plan. Despite the all-out efforts by Minister Kim and MND officials, 
they failed to persuade the National Assembly. During the process of trying to 
persuading the National Assembly, precious time for the implementation of DRP 
307 was wasted. The MND’s request was finally discarded at the end of the 18th 
National Assembly’s term in May 2012, leaving the MND in total frustration.
 Because of the failure to reorganize the higher command structure, DRP 307 
could not maintain the momentum. Instead of implementing other projects in the 
plan, Minister Kim and the MND decided to make another more detailed reform 
plan targeting the year 2030, which meant ten years’ postponement of the reform 
completion. They named the new plan “Defense Reform Basic Plan (DRBP) ’11–
’30” and adjusted (to be specific, postponed) the reform schedules to a maximum 
of ten years. 
 The name of DR “2020” became inappropriate because of the extension of the 
target year from 2020 to 2030. However, MND did not use the term “DR 2030” 
and only stopped using the term DR 2020. At the same time, MND started to 
update the defense reform plan annually and replaced DRBP ’11–’30 with DRBP 
’12–’30 on August 29, 2012. Since then, DR 2020 seemed to have turned into a 
long-term “development” plan instead of “reform” plan. DRBP ’11–’30 or DRBP 
’12–’30 did not have any impact on the ongoing defense activities, because the 
Lee Myung-bak administration was scheduled to be replaced in February 2013. 
These plans served as references for the defense reform of the current Park Geun-
hye administration, which spent a little more than a year and released its own 
plan, DRBP ’14–’30, in March 2014. Hence, the de facto termination of the DR 
2020 occurred during the Lee administration, especially after the introduction of 
DRP 307 in March 2011. DRBP ’11–’30 and DRBP ’12–’30 existed only on paper, 
and DRBP ’14–’30 does not include new or ambitious reform projects.
 
ANALYSIS OF DEFENSE REFORM 2020
ACHIEVEMENTS
The MND’s biennial National Defense White Papers issued in 2006, 2008, and 
2010 did not mention any achievements or assessment of South Korean defense 
reform efforts (Ministry of National Defense 2012, 117). The MND enumerates 
some achievements regarding the defense reform it made between the year 2010 
and 2012 in Defense White Paper 2012. However, most of the projects on the 
list did not appear to exceed the natural improvement that would have taken 
place in the absence of any reform plan. Most publications of the MND regarding 
DR 2020 stopped at explaining the necessity, concept, direction, and planned 
projects of defense reform and did not mention any achievements.
 There was no objective assessment by researchers or scholars outside the 
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MND of DR 2020’s achievements, either. However, many criticisms were raised 
when the Lee Myung-bak administration took office and attempted to review 
the original DR 2020 (North East Asia Peace Forum/Korean Defense and 
Security Forum 2008; Lee 2009). Even during the review, the Lee Myung-bak 
administration did not pay much attention to the achievements of the DR 2020, 
but discussed the relevance of the reform plan, which was made by the preceding 
administration. DR 2020 appeared to have existed more as a plan for discussion 
than as a plan for implementation.
 At this point, I roughly evaluate the achievements of DR 2020 based on its 
key foci, which were stipulated in the Law on Defense Reform. To begin, the 
South Korean military did not achieve any significant changes regarding the key 
goals of DR 2020 such as “transforming the manpower-intensive force structure 
to a technology-intensive one,” “transforming MND to a civilian-led one,” 
“strengthening the JSC,” “securing the necessary defense budget,” or “increasing 
the self-reliance.” It even failed to increase the civilian workforce in the MND 
close to the target level and was reprimanded for its poor achievements by the 
Ministry of Public Administration and Security in 2010 (Hankook Ilbo 2010). It 
is not that much of a stretch to conclude that the MND failed to make any reform-
level changes other than natural improvements that could have been achieved 
without any reform initiative.
ANALYSIS OF STRATEGY
The reform strategy adopted by the MND exemplifies the characteristics of the 
PCS. DR 2020 intended to accomplish its goals over 15 years through controlled 
and incremental changes, and the MND itself announced that it would pursue 
the reform “in a gradual and step-by-step manner” (Ministry of National Defense 
2005, 9). The roadmap for DR 2020 also demonstrated that the MND planned to 
pursue the reform by the PCS. The roadmap divided the reform into three stages. 
Its first stage was to complete the beginning of the reform by 2010, the second 
stage was to deepen the reform by 2015, and the third stage was to complete 
the reform by 2020 (Ministry of National Defense 2006a). The MND wanted to 
make perfect preparations and increase the speed of implementation in a gradual 
manner as clearly described in the PCS.
 The frequent replacement of defense ministers forced the MND to spend 
more time in planning before doing any real implementation and forced it to 
adopt the PCS. Defense Minister Yoon, who initiated DR 2020, was replaced 
by Kim Jang-soo in November 2006, just before the passage of the Defense 
Reform Act. Minister Kim served just over a year and he could not pursue 
speedy implementation of the plan because of the imminent election of the next 
administration in December 2007. The first Defense Minister of the Lee Myung-
bak administration, Lee Sang-hee, took more than a year to review the plan and 
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was replaced by Kim Tae-young just after the release of the revised version of 
DR 2020 in June 2009. Minister Kim Tae-young’s term was interrupted by the 
bombardment of Yeonpyeong Island in November 2010, after just over a year 
in service. In a span of less than five years, five South Korean Defense Ministers 
handled DR 2020—that is, since the passage of the legislation in December 2006 
until the introduction of DRP 307 in March 2011, a total of 51 months. 
 During those 51 months, the MND spent about 30 months to review and revise 
the existing plan: 18 months from the presidential election in December 2007 to 
the release of the revised version of DR 2020 in June 2009, and 12 months from 
the Cheonan incident in March 2010 to the release of the DRP 307 in March 2011. 
The DR 2020 was plagued by frequent interruptions and long planning periods 
that prohibited any tangible achievements from being made. Figure 2 illustrates 
the interruptions. 
Figure 2. The Pattern of Change in DR 2020
 Moreover, the South Korean defense ministers and MND officials did not seem 
to recognize clearly the pitfalls of the PCS. They appeared to think that the slow 
pace of change would be very natural for peacetime defense reform. They did 
not express much concern that the slow pace of implementation could result in 
cancellation or interruption of the reform plan at any point until the year 2020. 
They seemed to think that the review of previous plans by a new defense minister 
or administration would be quite natural and did not worry much about the waste 
of time for the implementation. This is why they delayed the target time from 
South Korea’s Failure to Implement “Defense Reform 2020” | The Korean Journal of International Studies 12-2 | 393
the year 2020 to the year 2030 without any apology or explanation to the South 
Korean public.
 The case of the South Korean DR 2020 demonstrates the typical problems 
that the PCS can bring when attempting reform. Despite strong support from 
President Roh and the strong will of Defense Minister Yoon, who were the driving 
forces behind the initiation of DR 2020, DR 2020 ended up wasting its initial 
golden time in making a perfect plan. If Defense Minister Yoon had employed 
the CAS and pursued immediate across-the-board changes to the military, he 
would have achieved bigger reformative outcomes by taking full advantage of his 
political power during his relatively longer term.
 However, the adoption of the CAS should not be equated with success of the 
South Korean defense reform. Other important factors could have affected the 
outcome of the reform as well. For example, the budget constraints limited 
the scope and speed of the reform regarding the South Korean defense reform 
(Klingner 2011; No 2012). The actual annual increase of the defense budget 
during the Roh Moo-hyun administration was about 8.8% on average in contrast 
to the 9.8% request. The Lee Myung-bak administration provided only a 5.2% 
annual increase of defense budget, although it had promised an increase of 7.6%. 
This gap in the defense budget functioned as the main reason why MND had 
to revise the plan repeatedly. By 2010, Defense Reform 2020 already had a 42 
trillion won shortfall, causing the MND to admit that it was unable to achieve 
the initial goals of the defense reform (Klingner 2011). However, if the ROK 
military had reset the priority and increased the efficiency throughout all fields 
of the military, it could have minimized the budget constraints to the reform. 
As Stephen P. Rosen cautioned, “it is wrong to focus on budgets when trying to 
understand or promote innovation” (1991, 42).
 The resistance from members of the military including the higher rank 
generals may have affected the delay of South Korean defense reform. Although 
the MND had promised to reduce the strength of total forces to 500,000 from 
680,000 in 2005 including the 15% reduction of number of generals until the 
year 2020, it continuously adjusted the target strength and delayed the schedule 
of the reduction. However, because South Korean armed forces have been led 
dominantly by the army generals of graduates of the Korea Military Academy, 
there could not be much room for bureaucratic struggle among various interest 
groups compared to what one sees regarding U.S. armed forces (Zakheim 2007). 
On the contrary, more of the blame should be placed on the defense ministers’ 
lack of passion for defense reform than on the ordinary South Korean officers in 
the military bureaucracy.
 The pressures and top-down directions by political leaders may have distorted 
the implementation strategy of the MND. For example, the political leaders 
in the Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun administrations demanded the ROK 
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military to reduce the strength of its forces based on these presidents’ optimistic 
perception of the North Korean threat (Kwon 2013). At the same time, they forced 
the military to retake the OPCON authority from the CFC (Kwon 2013), even 
though the military was not ready to do so. However, these two political decisions 
could have been used as a strong political support for the defense reform, if South 
Korean military leaders were wise enough to take advantage of the political will to 
reform the military. Eventually, these decisions were reversed at the beginning of 
the Park Geun-hye administration. 
 Researchers might identify these factors mentioned above as the main culprits for 
the failure of the South Korean defense reform. However, these factors might not be 
insurmountable ones regarding the defense reform. They might be key considerations in 
selection and shaping of the right strategy. A reformist leader should and could come up 
with creative solutions to handle these factors appropriately and minimize the negative 
affect to the reform. If South Korean defense ministers had had strong determination for 
the successive implementation of defense reform promises and selected the right strategy 
to overcome the negative affect of these factors, only little room would have been left for 
these factors to hamper their reform efforts. The strategy is to develop the best “ways” and 
mobilize the most “means” to overcome obstacles or harsh environment in order to reach 
the “ends” in mind. 
LESSONS FROM SOUTH KOREA DEFENSE REFORM 2020
ADOPT THE CHANGE AND ADJUST STRATEGY
Most of all, the South Korean military should recognize the importance of the 
implementation strategy it adopts for its defense reform. The case of DR 2020 
clearly demonstrates the fate of a reform that uses a wrong strategy. The South 
Korean military should recognize the downside of the conventional strategy it has 
adopted in most of its reform initiatives, and try to set the appropriate reform 
strategy in addition to the contents of defense reform. 
 The South Korean military may need to adopt the CAS focusing on producing 
immediate results. It had already developed several comprehensive and detailed 
plans for long-term defense reform such as DR 2020, DRP 307, DRBP ’11–’30, 
DRBP ’12–’30, and DRBP ’14–’30. It should focus on clearing the backlogs of the 
previous reform plans instead of waiting for the planned execution schedules of 
the DRBP ’14–’30, which was released in March 2014.
 The DRBP ’14–’30 needs to be implemented without any further fundamental 
adjustments for the coming years. Some projects in that plan need to be 
expedited. The military leaders should do their best to identify problems such 
as budget limitations with regard to the implementation of the plan and find 
solutions in order to ensure the implementation. For the time being, they should 
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be the commanders on site for the timely implementation of the plan. Instead of 
providing “vision of distant future capabilities,” they should focus on the “solution 
of specific immediate problems” (Knox and Murray 2001, 185). 
REDUCE PLANNING TIME FOR SPEEDY IMPLEMENTATION
The South Korean military should try to reduce the planning time in its reform 
efforts. It should recognize the opportunity cost it would incur by delaying 
implementation for the sake of perfect planning. If the South Korean military 
recognizes the seriousness of the North Korean nuclear threat, it cannot have 
the luxury to spend much time on planning. The South Korean military needs to 
make the most of the existing plans and avoid fanfare announcements.
 The South Korean military leaders should try to make decisions faster. They 
should delegate appropriate authority to their subordinates so that they can 
focus on key issues. They should begin the reform with selected projects, which 
could be done within their given authority or term. Since South Korean defense 
ministers serve for an average of 16 months,2 it is almost impossible for any 
minister to implement multiple projects in his term. Because the South Korean 
military has too long a backlog, military leaders can find sufficient projects for 
reform that can be done under their authority and during their terms.
 In order not to be stuck in the planning period, the South Korean military 
should depart from its previous reform focus—that is, the structural change of 
the military. As clearly demonstrated by the case of DR 2020, structural reform 
requires too much time for review, discussion, and planning. It also needs 
additional time for building consensus among members of the military. Structural 
reform mostly requires the revision of laws, which may take years. Since the 
previous South Korean defense reform initiatives focused on structural reform, 
it might be an appropriate time to move the reform focus to the operation and 
management sides of the military. This approach can increase the participation of 
all members in the reform, build consensus more easily, and produce immediate 
improvements. 
 
CONNECT THE PLAN TO THE IMPLEMENTATION THROUGH 
FEASIBILITY ANALYSIS
If the South Korean military wants to heighten the rate of implementation of its 
reform efforts, it needs to increase feasibility of the reform projects. DR 2020 
clearly demonstrated the loopholes of an optimistic plan that turned out to be 
based on the wrong calculation of available budget. DRBP ’14–’30, release in 
March 2014, assumed that 7.2% annual increase of the defense budget would be 
2 Twenty-three Defense Ministers served for 30 years (360 months) since 1983, when the 
system of five-year terms for the administration started. In sum, 360 months divided by 23 Defense 
Ministers equals 15.6 months per Defense Minister.
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possible between the year 2014 and the year 2030. However, the actual defense 
budget growth for the year 2014 was only 3.7%. Without an accurate calculation 
of the available defense budget, no reform project can be implemented as 
promised. The reform plan would go through another revision process to adjust 
to the reduced defense budget and could repeat the same mistakes of DR 2020.
 For this reason, the South Korean military should start its reform by increasing 
efficiency across the board. It must minimize waste and redundancy in order 
to allocate more money for reform projects without decreasing the military’s 
readiness level. Sometimes, the military should be able to cancel several less 
necessary projects in order to ensure the necessary budget for indispensable or 
urgent projects. It should perform an analysis of cost-effectiveness of reform 
projects before it decides the investment. The increase in the efficiency of 
the military would be a key ingredient of contemporary defense reform and a 
foundation for the success of key reform projects. 
 Another urgent, quickly implementable and mostly budget-free reform area 
for the South Korean military would be the improvement of unreasonable 
regulations, custom, and culture in the military. These were neglected in the 
previous reform initiatives. However, these are the roots of problems for the 
South Korean military. “Loss of focus on cultural change . . . will undo whatever 
programmatic progress is made in matters of acquisition, training, logistics and 
operations” (Zakheim 2007, 28). 
 To be specific, how can the South Korean military become an advanced military 
under current personnel systems, which rotate officers in a year or two? How 
can it encourage all military members to participate in the reform efforts with 
its current strict top-down and one-way communication culture? The leaders of 
the South Korean military should start to make most regulations, custom, and 
culture more reasonable and productive. These changes can be done without any 
intervention or financial support by the government and the National Assembly. 
ESTABLISH OVERSIGHT MECHANISMS FOR 
THE IMPLEMENTATION AS PLANNED
Most of all, the presidential office and the National Assembly should check 
whether the South Korean military is implementing its reform plans as it 
promised. They should ask the MND to report the progress regularly and demand 
explanation if there is a discrepancy between the executed results and planned 
projects. The president or the National Assembly can make a special team 
composed of independent civilian experts to oversee the execution of the reform 
plans of the MND and to provide necessary supports for the success of defense 
reform. 
 The South Korean military also should recognize the importance of evaluating 
the degree and quality of the implementation of its reform plans and create its 
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own team for the job. The Office of Defense Reform in the MND should focus 
on this job instead of simply making another plan. The office, on behalf of the 
defense minister, should ask the respective services, agencies, and units for 
roadmaps for their own reforms. Through objective and persistent oversight, 
South Korea can prevent the repeated production of overoptimistic military 
reform plans. It should make officials accountable for their failure or success 
in the reform efforts. Without active oversight of the implementation, plans of 
the defense reform will look good on paper but never come to complete fruition 
(Zakheim 2007). 
 The South Korean people may need to monitor actively the status and 
achievements of their military’s reform efforts as well. The public can demand 
regular release of the concept, strategy, direction, contents, and roadmaps for the 
reform and provide feedback if necessary. In particular, as representatives of the 
people, the National Assembly members should ascertain the details of defense 
reform projects, closely monitor their progress, and sometimes stimulate the fast 
implementation. Members can take a leading role by holding various types of 
discussions regarding defense reform issues and reconcile the plan with the reality. 
They should support or stop reform projects through the prudent allocation of 
budgets.
CONCLUSION
It would be very difficult to evaluate any military’s reform efforts as successful 
or unsuccessful unless the military was tested in a war. As the amount of sold 
merchandise decides the ability of the salesperson in the market, the victory 
in war would be the only indicator of the success of the reform. If a particular 
military won the war, the reform conducted before the war should be evaluated as 
successful. As the acquisition time for military equipment is long, the result of a 
certain defense reform initiative would emerge far in the future. 
 However, a gradual approach in making changes tends to delay or hinder 
urgently needed reforms. Reform projects could be stalled midway through 
the change for various reasons such as leadership change, economic downturn, 
unexpected incidents, and so forth. If a particular military is too hesitant in 
making changes, it would create a capability gap with an adversary that is more 
proactive. A military could use the gradual approach—identified in this study 
as Plan and Change Strategy (PCS)—as an excuse not to make any changes 
until the real-world situation dictates. Therefore, one could apply the change 
first strategy—i.e., Change and Adjust Strategy (CAS)—especially when reform 
becomes very urgent.
 The South Korean military appeared to adopt the PCS and, before one plan 
The Korean Journal of International Studies 12-2 | 398
replaced another, failed to achieve the planned results. It spent too much time 
in planning and allowed interruption in the middle of implementation. Although 
Defense Minister Yoon ensured the continuation of DR 2020 until the year 
2020 by passing a law, the law could not defend DR 2020. DR 2020 was revised 
by change of administrations, threatened by the Cheonan warship sinking and 
Yeonpyeong bombardment in 2010, practically destroyed by DRP 307 in March 
2011, and almost terminated by the introduction of DRBP ’11–’30 and DRBP ’12–
’30, which extended the target year from the year 2020 to the year 2030. South 
Korean DR 2020 clearly demonstrated the downside of the PCS in the military 
reform. 
 The incumbent Park Geun-hye administration should learn the lessons evident 
from the failure of DR 2020 and adopt a different strategy. The government 
should expedite the implementation of the plan it announced in March 2014 
instead of updating the plan next year. If it adopts the same PCS for its defense 
reform, it will repeat the same mistakes as the previous administrations. 
 The South Korean military should take every measure to increase the 
speed of implementation. It should focus on some key projects for immediate 
implementation rather than annually updating the plan. It should select only a 
few urgent projects and allocate more time and resources on them. The leaders 
of the South Korean military should try to make decisions faster in order not to 
waste time. “The cost of failure to change now will be a far higher price in lives 
and treasure to be paid” (Knox and Murray 2001, 194). Because of the importance 
of the budget in this capitalist society, the South Korean military should start 
its reform initiative by increasing efficiency across the board. It must minimize 
waste and redundancy and save the money in order to concentrate on more 
important projects. It needs to urge all military members to increase efficiency in 
their offices and work. When the military does its best to spend the given budget 
wisely, the National Assembly should respond by allocating more money for fast 
defense reform.
 Another urgent measure for successful defense reform is establishing an 
oversight mechanism on the progress or result of the reform. The South Korean 
government and/or the National Assembly should recognize the necessity of an 
objective and persistent oversight on the implementation of the defense reform. 
If the assembly seeks a more objective assessment, it can ask an independent and 
civilian organization to conduct one. 
 Beginning defense reform may not be that difficult. However, completing it 
with productive achievements is quite difficult. Any leader who wants to achieve 
a successful reform should make every effort to implement the reform plan with a 
proper strategy. 
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